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State Strategies in International Bargaining

Play by the Rules or Change Them?. Cambridge Studies in International Relations

By (author) Heather Elko McKibben
Format: Paperback / softback
Publisher: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Published: 20th Oct 2016
Dimensions: w 152mm h 229mm d 18mm
Weight: 465g
ISBN-10: 1107450543
ISBN-13: 9781107450547
Barcode No: 9781107450547
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Synopsis
Bargaining between states in the international system is governed by rules which shape and constrain their bargaining behavior. However, these rules can be changed. When, why, and how do states bargain differently? Drawing on original qualitative and quantitative evidence, this book demonstrates how the rules of the game influence the cooperative or coercive nature of the strategies adopted by all states in a negotiation. These effects influence each state's incentives regarding whether to play by the rules or to change them. Examining these incentives, as well as the conditions under which states can act on them, McKibben explains the wide variation in states' bargaining strategies. Several bargaining interactions are analyzed, including decision-making in the European Union, multilateral trade negotiations, climate change negotiations, and negotiations over the future status of Kosovo. This book provides a rich understanding of the nuances of states' behavior in international bargaining processes.

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'Uses extensive empirical research to cast fresh light on the understudied question of why states use different bargaining strategies at different times. Other scholars should read this interesting contribution.' John Odell, University of Southern California 'McKibben offers the most systematic rationalist treatment of bargaining strategies in international relations seen so far. Beautifully and parsimoniously argued, and applied to no fewer than four different issue areas, it is a model for research on international negotiation.' Brian Rathbun, University of Southern California