In the past, economists have not always been able to agree on the idea that copyright is an efficient way of protecting cultural intellectual property. Indeed, many economists argue that copyright is not even necessary. In "Copyright and Economic Theory" a rigorously extensive yet simplified economic theory of copyright piracy is presented, and used to analyze important aspects of intellectual property transactions including the royalty contact, optimal copyright law and copyright collectives. The author also analyzes important areas of discussion in copyright, such as how can it be that a certain degree of privacy is beneficial, not only socially, but also for copyright holders and producers of originals? Are linear royalty contracts optimal? How many copyright collectives should a given economy have? Would a copyright collective prefer to act as a leader to a follower in a Stackelberg duopoly? The book analyzes and contrasts existing theories concerning the economic theory of copyright, and presents a simple economic model in which copyright can be effectively studied, considering all principal areas of interest in copyright.
This book should be useful reading for academics in economics, law and industrial organization as well as legal professionals including lawyers, copyright collectives and relevant governmental organizations.