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The Principal Agent Model

The Economic Theory of Incentives. The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics Series No.162

Format: Hardback
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, United Kingdom
Published: 29th Jul 2003
Dimensions: w 244mm h 169mm d 57mm
Weight: 1406g
ISBN-10: 1843762404
ISBN-13: 9781843762409
Barcode No: 9781843762409
Synopsis
Incentive theory is the most important development in economics in the last forty years. The principal-agent model is the core of this theory. This authoritative collection brings together the essential literature concerning the principal-agent model when no restrictions on the design of the principal's contract exist in terms of complexity, enforcement or rationality. Part I covers the foundations of the principal-agent theory from the first historical formulation of the problem to the first attempts to formalize it. Part II deals with the case of moral hazard and adverse selection is the topic of Part III. Part IV presents contributions on current research issues such as the impact of communication constraints, endogenous information structures and multidimensional incentive problems. The Principal Agent Model will be an indispensable reference source for all students, researchers and professionals specialising in this subject.

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'The economics of asymmetric information has been the most important new tool of economic analysis and has proved powerful in explaining many aspects of the functioning of the economy. The principal-agent relation is a central aspect of asymmetric information. The anthology is exceptionally useful in bringing together every major paper in the field; its thoroughness reflects the deep knowledge of its editor, Jean-Jacques Laffont, one of the outstanding contributors to the field.' -- Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University, US