Trust and Economic Learning
The 1990s have witnessed a vast growth of research on the topics of trust and learning. This can be explained by the profound technological and organizational changes that have made both inter-and intra-firm trust indispensable for sustaining the forms of learning that underlie successful competitive performance.
Trust and Economic Learning brings together innovative research by an internationally recognized group of scholars from Europe and the United States. The distinction between trust and a variety of related concepts, including reputation, implicit contracts and confidence is examined. The links between learning and trust are then explored using a number of original empirical contributions and theoretical approaches including an adaptation of game theory, Marengo's computational model of organizational learning and the `step by step' rule developed by Lazaric and Lorenz. In addition, Bayesian learning models are compared with evolutionary approaches based on tools of artificial intelligence to evaluate the preconditions for establishing trust.
This unique volume will be a highly useful companion to traditional graduate-level texts in industrial organization. It constitutes a valuable source of knowledge for practitioners and policymakers alike. It will also be of interest to scholars interested in evolutionary and institutional economics, technology and innovation and international business.
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What Reviewers Are Saying
`This book is a welcome addition to two growing literatures in economics: on "trust" and "learning". . . . The book is well produced and well edited by Lazaric and Lorenz who provide a useful introduction and overview in their chapter on "The learning dynamics of trust, reputation and confidence".' -- Jonathan Michie, The Economic Journal