Two Strategies for Europe
De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance
This timely book explores the often stormy French-U.S. relationship and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1958D1969). The first work on this subject to draw on previously inaccessible material from U.S. and French archives, the study offers a comprehensive analysis of Gaullist policies toward NATO and the United States during the 1960s, a period that reached its apogee with de GaulleOs dramatic decision in 1966 to withdraw from NATOOs integrated military arm. This launched the French policy of autonomy within NATO, which has since been adapted without having been abandoned. De GaulleOs policy often has been caricatured by admirers and detractors alike as an expression of nationalism or anti-Americanism. Yet Frederic Bozo argues that although it did reflect the GeneralOs quest for grandeur, it also, and perhaps more important, stemmed from a genuine strategy designed to build an independent Europe and to help overcome the system of blocs. Indeed, the author contends, de GaulleOs actions forced NATO to adapt to new strategic realities. Retracing the different phases of de GaulleOs policies, Bozo provides valuable insight into current French approaches to foreign and security policy, including the recent attempt by President Chirac to redefine and normalize the France-NATO relationship. As the author shows, de GaulleOs legacy remains vigorous as France grapples with European integration, a new role within a reformed NATO, and relations with the United States.
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What Reviewers Are Saying
Bozo, a top French scholar of foreign policy and strategic affairs, has written a masterful account of the intricate issues that have plagued Franco-American relations for so long..... [A] fine monograph. . . . Although the strength of the book is its explication of Gaullist politics, Bozo never loses sight of the American perspective or the context of Cold War developments..... This is a well-researched and well-written account of Franco-U.S. and Franco-Alliance relations under de Gaulle, drawing on interesting archival material and proffering a valuable French perspective on an issue-area still, in general, inadequately comprehended. This sympathetic translation into English should be welcomed.... For students or scholars trying to probe the causes of the Franco-American rift of the 1960s, or researchers trying to establish what has been recently been written on NATO doctrine or de Gaulle in French, [this book] is an excellent starting point. . . .[A] stimulating and valuable exercise in comparative archival study which will be of interest to both specialists in U.S. foreign policy and those concentrating on Western European diplomacy.... The prose is clear, the pace is brisk, the scholarship reliable. Bozo provides a thoughtful exposition of de Gaulle's challenge to the United States.....